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TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ON
INDIRECT REGULATION OF THE STATES
INTRODUcTION
The cost of imported oil and gas has increased substantially over
the past decade.' To decrease the country's reliance on foreign en-
ergy supplies, 2 the government has declared a national policy of en-
couraging the development of the nation's coal reserves.' Surface
mining is the primary method of extracting coal in the United States,
accounting for nearly sixty percent of all coal produced.' It is well-
1. Effort to Soften Environmental Rules Likely, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, §
D, at 1, col. 3; see S. Rep. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as House Report], reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 593, 609.
2. Statistics from the United States Department of Commerce indicate that
crude oil prices during the period 1973-78 were 130.3% higher than during the
period 1970-73. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of tile United States
604 (1979).
3. In the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited
as SMCRA], § 101(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (Supp. I 1978), Congress recognized that
"coal mining operations presently contribute significantly to the Nation's energy re-
quirements .... [I]t is, therefore, essential to the national interest to insure the
existence of an expanding and economically healthy ... coal mining industry." Id.,
30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (Supp. 11 1978); see House Report, supra note 1, at 71, re-
printed in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 609 (coal wvill necessarily provide
more of the nation's energy needs in the future because it represents over 90% of
the country's hydrocarbon reserves). In his National Energy Plan. President Carter
set as a national goal an increase in annual coal use to a level approximately double
the 600 million tons used in 1975. Executive Office of the President, Energy Policy
and Planning, the National Energy Plan xiii (1977). See generally Brownell, Energy
Independence-The Return to Coal, Constraints on Production and Utilization of
Our Most Abundant National Energy Resource, 11 St. Mary's L.J. 677, 678-80
(1980); Truitt & Abeles, Coal-Fired Electric Generating Facilities: Impediments
Under Federal Environmental Legislation, 11 St. Mary's L.J. 609, 610 (19S0).
4. House Report, supra note 1, at 72, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 610. According to statistics from the Bureau of Mines. United States
coal production has been somewhat unstable during the past quarter century. In
1953, 457 million tons were produced. It was not until 1965, however, that more
than 500 million tons were consistently produced. By 1976. the nation's coal mines
produced approximately 670 million tons of coal. Significantly, the percentage of coal
production derived from surface mines has increased steadily since 1953. In that
year, surface mined coal accounted for less that 25% of the coal produced. By 1971,
surface coal production had reached 50% of all coal production. Id., reprinted in
[1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 610.
589
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
recognized, however, that the process of surface mining' may se-
verely impair the quality of the environment.' Acid drainage from
surface mines, for example, can cause water pollution.' Weathering
of the earth at a mine site results in land erosion.8 Surface mining
may also cause aesthetic nuisances and disrupt community life.9
5. "[S]urface mining consists of removing earth from the coal" as opposed to
removing coal from the earth as in underground mining. id. at 76, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 614. There are three categories of surface
mining: contour, area, and open pit. Contour mining, which is generally lone in
areas with steep terrain, such as Appalachia, involves excavating that part of a hill-
side at which the coal seam meets the surface, removing the ground over the coal
seam, and then following the contour of the seam as deeply as is profitable. This
technique causes a serpentine bench. A variation of contour mining is mountaintop
mining. It involves following a coal seam through the mountain, and then dumping
the earth removed down the slope. As a result, the mountain is levelled. In area
surface mining, which usually is done on flat, rolling countryside, the earth removed
is piled to one side of the mine on a ridge adjacent to the area from which the coal
was removed. This technique results in a furrowed mine site ending in a ditch. The
third category is open pit mining. This method does not actually produce a pit, but,
because the thickness of the coal removed is much greater than that of the earth
removed, a depression is left in the ground even after the land is refilled. Id. at 77,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 615.
6. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 50 ("Uncontrolled surface coal mining in
many regions has effected a stark, unjustifiable, and intolerable degradation in the
quality of life in local communities."); House Report, supra note 1, at 58-59, re-
printed in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 596-97 (surface mining reduces
recreational values and fishkills); Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. 553, 554 (1979)
(Rep. Udall, a leading sponsor of the bill that eventually became the SMCRA, be-
lieved that the pollution caused by surface mining was already critical); Note, Energy
v. Environment: Who Wins In the Race for Coal in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 6,1, 6,3
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Energy v. Environment] ("[T]he mining process can result
in pollution of streams, destruction of fish and wildlife, damage to recreational areas,
landslides, and flooding."); Andrus Prohibits Coal Strip Mining on 9,000 Acres Near
Federal Park, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1980, § A, at 20, col. 3 ("Environmentalists had
vigorously opposed .. .strip min[ing] . . . , saying it would ruin the panorama ....
cause air and noise pollution . . . , destroy vegetation and wildlife habitats and cause
erosion and flooding in the area.").
7. House Report, supra note 1, at 79, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 616; Appalachian Regional Comm'n, Acid Mine Drainage in Appalachia,
H.R. Doc. No. 180, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969). Acid mine drainage is only one
of several equally serious consequences that may result from the hydrological imbal-
ance in an area. In one instance, for example, a mine operation created black water
in a river, killing a large quantity of fish. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 444 n.19 (W.D. Va.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S.
Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
8. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 51. Erosion is a particularly severe problem
in the western coal areas because the annual rainfall does not provide enough mois-
ture to establish vegetative cover on restored lands. Id.; see Rochow, The Far Side of
Paradox: State Regulation of the Environmental Effects of Coal Mining, 81 W. Va.
L. Rev. 559, 560 (1979).
9. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. 11 1978). Con-
gress found that surface mining adversely affected the public welfare "by impairing
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Pursuant to its power under the commerce clause," Congress
enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation" Act of 19772
natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, [and] by creating hazards
dangerous to life and property by degrading the quality of life in local communities.*
Id., 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. I 1978).
10. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to "'regulate Commerce ...
among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause is the
primary source of congressional regulatory power. L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 5-4, at 232 (1978). In enacting the SMCRA, Congress apparently based its
commerce clause power on the protection of interstate commerce from the adverse
effects of pollution from surface mines in other states. See Senate Report, supra note
1, at 49-53; House Report, supra note 1, at 57-61, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 595-99; cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 41 (1937) (Congress may regulate private activities that "would have a most serious
effect upon interstate commerce."). Commerce clause justification for the SMCRA
may also be found in the protection of agricultural production. See Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (Congress can control the production of wheat by
farmers for their own consumption because the cumulative effect of such consump-
tion has an impact on interstate commerce); SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102(f), 30
U.S.C. § 1202(f) (Supp. 11 1978); L. Tribe, supra, § 5-5, at 237.
11. Reclamation generally means restoring mined land to its original state. House
Report, supra note 1, at 79-80, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
616-17. There are two phases to reclamation. The first entails backfilling, regrading,
and reestablishing drainage patterns. These procedures restore the desired surface
contour and proper drainage under it. The second phase requires revegetation. This
is accomplished through preparation of the topsoil, fertilization, cultivation, and
seeding. In humid eastern states, the risk of slides, siltation, and sedimentation is
reduced by keeping the removed earth at the mine site. In the mid-west and west,
this technique mitigates the adverse effects of surface mining on underground perco-
lating waters. Id., reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 616-17.
12. SMCRA, supra note 3, 88 101-908, 30 U.S.C. 88 1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1978).
The SMCRA was the product of six years of legislative effort. The Nixon administra-
tion originally proposed a surface mining bill in 1971. (1971] 2 Envir. Rep. (BNA)
610, 918. Although modified versions of these bills, see S. 630, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R. 6482, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), were approved by the House, 118
Cong. Rec. 35031 (1972), and by the Senate Committee On Interior and Insular
Affairs, 118 Cong. Rec. 30979 (1972), they were abandoned at the end of 1972 be-
cause they were irreconcilable. See [1972] 3 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 712. During the next
two years, the House and Senate considered several similar bills, H.R. 181, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 42 (1973); H.R. 190, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119
Cong. Rec. 42 (1973); S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 33333 (1973),
including one that would have ended all surface mining within 18 months of its
passage, H.R. 1000, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 62 (1973). In 1974, a
surface mining and reclamation bill, S. 425, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec.
25259 (1974), was passed by Congress. 120 Cong. Rec. 25273 (1974) (Senate passage);
id. at 40732 (House passage). President Ford pocket vetoed the bill, however, be-
cause he feared that it would cause unemployment and inflation, and abate coal
production. 120 Cong. Rec. 41996 (1974). Early in 1975, Congress held hearings on
the administration's objections to the bill vetoed in 1974, and a new bill, H.R. 25,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), was passed. 121 Cong. Rec, 13663 (1975) (Senate pas-
sage); id. at 13503 (House passage). President Ford again vetoed the bill. 121 Cong.
Rec. 15421 (1975); see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 53. See generally Note, A
Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. 775
(1979).
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(SMCRA) to improve and regularize the enforcement of surface min-
ing reclamation regulations throughout the nation 13 without unduly
discouraging coal production." The SMCRA is a detailed regulatory
program that basically requires coal mining companies to restore
mined land to its pre-mined condition." For example, all land must
be returned to its approximate original contour." When prime farm-
land is mined, the soil zones must be preserved and reconstituted so
that the land is as agriculturally productive as unmined prime farm-
land in neighboring areas. 7
Although Congress enacted the SMCRA because it believed that
the individual states were unable to remedy the various problems
caused by increased surface mining,' it contemplated that the states
13. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102(a), (e), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (e) (Supp. 11 1978).
See generally Kite, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: An
Overview of Reclamation Requirements and Implementation, 13 Land & Water Rev.
703 (1978); Comment, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 9
St. Mary's L.J. 863 (1978).
14. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102(f), (k), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f), (k) (Snpp. 11 1978).
15. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 515(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
16. Id. § 701(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(2) (Supp. 11 1978). The Act defines "approxi-
mate original contour" is "that surface configuration achieved by backfilling and grad-
ing of the mined area so that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access
roads, closely resembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to mining
and blends into and complements the drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain,
with all highwalls and spoil piles eliminated." Id., 30 U.S.C. § 1291(2) (Supp. II
1978).
17. Id. § 510(d)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). The SMCRA requires
that mine operators "restore the land affected to a condition capable of supporting
the uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better
uses of which there is reasonable likelihood." Id. § 515(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2)
(Supp. II 1978). This provision establishes only minimum requirements. The prime
farmland provisions further restrict reclamation by requiring, in effect, that all prime
farmlands be capable of producing their former yield after being mined. Id. §
510(d)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
18. House Report, supra note 1, at 73, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 611. Congress found that "surface mining and reclamation standards are
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of
coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the
several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations
within their borders." SMCRA, supra note 3, § 10l(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (Supp. II
1978). In its report, the House Committee On Interior and Insular Affairs found,
with some exceptions, that there had been a minimal effort by mine operators to
restore disturbed lands to their previous levels of productivity. Further, it noted that
the laws of 34 states had been ineffective in altering the situation. House Report,
supra note 1, at 73, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 611. In
support of its proposed environmental protection standards, the Committee noted
that these reclamation methods had been successfully employed by some mine oper-
ators in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. The methods practiced by those operators
included restoration of disturbed lands to their original contour and revegetation that
focused on preventing erosion and landslides on slopes beneath the mining sites. Id.
at 97, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 633.
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would eventually assume primary responsibility for formulating and
enforcing coal mining regulations.'" The SMCRA provides that a
federal program for surface mining and reclamation will be im-
plemented in all states only until the Secretary of the Interior accepts
comparable programs proposed by the individual states. - If a state
fails to submit a plan, or if the Secretary rejects the plan that is
submitted, a permanent plan, devised by the Secretary, will govern
the coal mining industry in that state.2
19. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 101(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) tSupp. 11 1978). see
House Report, supra note 1, at 85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 621-22; 125 Cong. Rec. S12352 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen.
Hatfield); id. at S12353 (remarks of Sen. Ford).
20. SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 503, 504, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254 (Supp. II
1978). The Secretary of the Interior will only approve a state plan pursuant to a
demonstration of its effectiveness. Id., 30 U.S.C. 88 1253, 1254 (Supp. 11 1978). The
SMCRA provides for both permanent and interim regulatory programs for mining
reclamation. Id. § 502, 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. 11 1978). Originally, the states were
to operate under interim regulations for six months prior to submitting their propos-
als to the Secretary for his approval. Id. § 502(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. 11
1978). The Senate has passed a bill to extend this period. S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. S12387 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979). The House has not yet
acted upon the bill. During the interim program, only 8 of the 25 environmental
protection performance standards must be met by the states. SYCRA, supra note 3,
88 502(b), (c), 515, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), (c), 1265 (Supp. 11 1978). The Secretary has
issued permanent regulations under which the SMCRlA is to be implemented. 30
C.F.R. § 700-845 (1980). State reclamation plans must be consistent with the
Secretary's regulations. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 503(a)(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7)
(Supp. 11 1978). The Secretary's regulations are highly specific, providing both strin-
gent guidelines for state-proposed programs and exacting procedures and techniques
for use in mining and reclamation operations. 30 C.F.R. § 816.1-.200 (1980). The
permanent regulations have been widely attacked as being unnecessarily detailed,
inflexible, and arbitrary. See, e.g., 125 Cong. Rec. S12350-89, S12353 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) ("The requirement that State programs be
consistent with the regulations inhibits the flexibility of the States in the design of
their programs."); Oversight-The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources 25, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings] (statement of Cov.
Herschler) (SMCRA not intended to require states to enact mirror image regulatory
programs); Note, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Regulatory
Controversies and Constitutional Challenges, 8 Ecology L.Q. 762, 764-68 (1980)
(OSM has "specified the precise procedures and techniques to be used in mining and
reclamation operations." (footnote omitted)); United States Regulatory Council,
Cooperation and Conflict 20-21, 31 (Jan. 1981) (OSM regulations are unnecessarily
detailed). Further, it has been asserted that the Secretary's regulations do not com-
port with Congress' intent that the states retain discretion in administering their
reclamation programs. 125 Cong. Rec. S12353 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of
Sen. Hatfield) ("States will not have the opportunity to design regulatory programs
which reflect local conditions."); see In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, No. 80-1308 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1980) (finding that the Secretary's regula-
tions are contrary to the intent of the SMCRA).
21. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. 11 1978).
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Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in National League of
Cities v. Usery' that the federal government may not use its com-
merce power to "directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional government functions,'' 3
several states have alleged that the prime farmland24 and certain orig-
inal contour provisions ' of the SMCRA are unconstitutional under
the tenth amendment.16 They argue that these provisions, in con-
junction with the provisions empowering the Secretary of the Interior
to reject state programs,- indirectly coerce the states to accept feder-
al regulation of their land, and thus impermissibly preempt the states'
legislative discretion over an area of traditionally local concern.2 The
22. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
23. Id. at 852.
24. SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 510(d)(1), 515(b)(7), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1260(d)(1),
1265(b)(7) (Supp. II 1978).
25. Id. §§ 515(b)(1)-(25), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(b)(1)-(25) (Supp. 11 1978).
26. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1776 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
27. SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 405(d), 503, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1235(d), 1253 (Supp. II
1978).
28. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1776 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596). The constitutionality of the SMCRA has
also been challenged on four other grounds. The coal mine operators argue that
certain provisions effect an unjust taking of private property in violation of the fifth
amendment because it is physically and economically impossible to satisfy the res-
toration requirements. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F.
Supp. 679, 680 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA)
1769, 1782-83 (S.D. Ind.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Star
Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325, 1331-33 (S.D. Iowa 1980);
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 436-42
(W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596). The
coal mine operators also argue that the SMCRA's enforcement and penalty provi-
sions, as applied, allow arbitrary abuses of power that irreparably harm them and,
thereby, deprive the operators of their procedural due process rights under the fifth
amendment. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679,
682 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1783-
84 (S.D. Ind.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Star Coal Co. v.
Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325, 1333-37 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 442-48 (W.D. Va.),
prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596). The states and coal
companies have alleged that the prime farmland provisions of the SMCRA exceed
Congress' power to regulate commerce under the commerce clause because these
provisions regulate an area of surface mining that has an insignificant effect on inter-
state commerce. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1771-73 (S.D.
Ind.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231). Finally, certain states
and coal companies have argued that the equal protection guarantee of the fifth
amendment is violated because they bear a greater proportion of the SMCRA's bur-
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two district courts that have directly addressed this issue have
accepted this reasoning and have held that the challenged provisions
of the SMCRA are unconstitutional.2 ' Two other district courts,
however, have indicated in dicta that there is no tenth amendment
violation because the SMCRA does not directly require state com-
pliance with federal requirements." This Note analyzes the suffi-
ciency of the states' challenge to the constitutionality of the SMCRA.
It contends that, because Congress has effectively deprived the states
of their ability to make fundamental decisions concerning the use of
their land, the tenth amendment is violated.
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY:
THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.""
Traditionally, the tenth amendment had been construed as imposing
no limitation on congressional power to regulate interstate commerce
under the commerce clause.32  In Fry v. United States,' however,
den than others. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1781-82 (S.D.
Ind.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231), Star Coal Co. v. Andrus,
14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325, 1333-34 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435-36 (W.D. Va.), prob.juris.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
29. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432 (\V.D. Va.), prob. juris. rioted, 101 S.
Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
30. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679, 682-83
(E.D. Tenn. 1980); Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325, 1331
(S.D. Iowa 1980).
31. U.S. Const. amend. X.
32. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court expansively inter-
preted Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the commerce clause.
Id. at 118. The Court noted that "'the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the
specific prohibitions of the Constitution." Id. at 116. In sustaining the validity of a
federal wage and hour law, the Court found that the tenth amendment %as no bar to
such congressional exercises of power because there was "'nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments . . . or that its purpose was other than to allay fears
that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and
that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." Id. at 124.
In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), ocerruled, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court strongly relied upon Darby in upholding the
constitutionality of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that broadened the
Act's application. Id. at 188-93. National League of Cities v. Usery, however, over-
ruled the Wirtz construction of the tenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 855.
33. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court indicated that Congress could not use its com-
merce power to impair the integrity of the states or to hinder their
ability to function independently within the federal system.3 The
Court reinforced this position in National League of Cities v. Usery l
when it held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was unconsti-
tutional as applied to the states, or their local political subdivisions,
to the extent that it displaced state policy decisions concerning em-
ployer-employee relations.- The Court determined that the states'
power to fix the wages paid to and hours worked by their employees
engaged in the performance of essential state activities was immune
to congressional regulation by virtue of the tenth amendment. 7
34. Id. at 547 n.7. In Fry, the Court held that a federal statute limiting increases
in wages and prices was valid as applied to state employees. Id. at 54748. It found
that because the federal action was of an emergency nature, limited in time, it in-
truded only minimally into state affairs. Id. at 548. Fry appears to be a transitional
case in the development of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the tenth amend-
ment. Although the Court suggested that federal interference with state functions
could outweigh the federal interest in promulgating a regulation, the Court seemed
unprepared to completely alter its interpretation of the tenth amendment. Therefore,
to achieve the desired result in Fry, the Court characterized the inflation of 1971 as
constituting an economic emergency. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist
suggested that the majority had not gonb far enough in recognizing the extent of
tenth amendment protection of traditional state functions. Id. at 549-59 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). He advocated the overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 421 U.S.
at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Several circuit courts appear to have anticipated
the Court's alteration of its approach to tenth amendment questions. Brown v. EPA,
521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975) (invalidating the use of sanctions by the EPA
against state governments for failure to comply with EPA regulations governing
pollution), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1975' (holding that the Clean Air
Act did not authorize the EPA's administrator to regulate private sources of pollution
by requiring states to enact statutes and to administer and enforce EPA programs),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530
F.2d 215, 288 (4th Cir. 1975) (invalidating EPA regulation requiring states to enact
enabling legislation under pain of civil and criminal penalties), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). But see Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 2,16,
259-61 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the EPA could direct a state's legislature to act,
decided prior to Fry, however, and relied primarily on Wirtz). See generally Note,
Protection of the Environment and Protection of the States: The Constitutional Issue
Raised by EPA Action Under the Clean Air Act, 7 Envt'l L. 383 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Protection of the Environment].
35. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
36. Id. at 852. Similarly, the Court has invalidated congressional use of the coin-
merce power when it conflicts with other constitutional provisions protecting the
rights of individuals. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (sixth
amendment right to trial).
37. 426 U.S. at 833. Professor Tribe, noting that "the Court was unclear as to the
source of the state sovereignty limitation on congressional power under the com-
merce clause," has suggested that National League oJ Cities may not be a tenth
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The Court, in National League of Cities, articulated two basic rules
concerning tenth amendment issues. First, there is a distinction be-
tween Congress' power to regulate areas of private endeavor and its
power to regulate the states in their function as states.' Congress
may always regulate private endeavor "even when its exercise may
pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result
which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress.""
The sole limitation on Congress is that the means it selects to effectu-
ate its purposes must be reasonably related to a constitutionally per-
missible end. 40 Second, Congress may not direct the states to act in
areas in which a federal regulatory scheme will alter the deliver), of
essential state services." The states' power to engage in discretion-
ary functions related to the delivery of such services may override the
power vested in Congress by the commerce clause " when these
amendment case. L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 5-22, at 308 n.9. He believes that it is
problematic to distinguish between congressional regulation of public and private
employers on the basis of the tenth amendment because of the apparent contradic-
tion between the Court's declaration in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7
(1975), that the amendment proscribes congressional regulation exercised "'in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system," and the tenth amendment's reservation of the same autonomy to the
states and the people. L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 5-22, at 308 n.9. Therefore, Profes-
sor Tribe suggests that National League of Cities may better be viewed as resting on
the essentiality of the states in the federal system. Id.
38. 426 U.S. at 84041, 845. Two state functions mentioned by the Court were
the power of a state to locate its seat of government, Coyle v. Oklahoma, 21 U.S.
559 (1911), and the power of a state to determine the %%-ages paid to and the hours
required of those whom the state employs to carn' out essential governmental opera-
tions. 426 U.S. at 845.
39. Id. at 840. Congress' power to regulate private commerce was first expan-
sively discussed and interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 2
U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). That case held a state statute granting a steamboat
monopoly unconstitutional because it conflicted with a license issued pursuant to a
federal statute. Id. at 105, 9 Wheat. at 239. Pursuant to Chief Justice Marshall's
broad interpretation of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the
commerce clause, the Court has demonstrated that such power may support virtually
any regulation of commerce. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)
(commerce power justified federal wage and price controls); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964) (commerce power justified federal
ban on discrimination at motel serving interstate travelers); \Vickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (commerce power justified federal regulation of farm prod-
ucts consumed by the producer).
40. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
41. 426 U.S. at 851-52. The Court specifically noted that the cost of providing
essential services, such as police and fire protection, would increase were the FLSA
to be applied directly to the states. Id. at 846-49.
42. Id. at 842-43. The concept that national power over the states should be
restrained in certain cases is not new. See Friendly, Federalism. a Foreword, 86 Yale
L.J. 1019, 1032-33 (1977) ('[J]udicial tide with respect to national power may ebb as
well as flow."). Courts have long recognized that certain concerns that may unavoid-
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activities are integral to the operation of states as sovereign entities.'
Federal regulation in these areas would effectively usurp the tenth
amendment reservation of power to the states.44 This second rule,
however, is not absolute. The majority noted, for example, that
federally imposed temporary emergency measures might not violate
the tenth amendment if they do not unduly interfere with state free-
dom of action.45 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,
ably involve interstate commerce are predominantly local in nature. Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1951) (highway use tax deemed
proper for state to impose despite effect on interstate commerce), overruled on other
grounds, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-90 (1977); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938)
(state regulation of weight and width of vehicles on interstate highways held a per-
missible burden on interstate commerce due to its local nature); see Willson v. The
Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.). In
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court pointed out that immunity attached only to
those functions that, if usurped, would lead to the "utter destruction of the State as a
sovereign political entity." Id. at 196 (footnote omitted). In Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542 (1975), however, the Court relaxed its stance and indicated that impairment
of a state's independent functioning is sufficient to constitute a violation of the tenth
amendment. Id. at 547 n.7.
43. 426 U.S. at 851. The Court mentioned fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation as activities essential to a state's
sovereignty. It noted that they did not comprise an "exhaustive catalogue" of those
activities within the "traditional operations of state and local governments." Id. at
851 n.16. The Court did not, however, explicitly outline the characteristics of essen-
tial activities. Such activities were characterized as "those performed by state and
local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law
and furnishing public services . . . which governments are created to provide ...
[and] which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id. at 851 (footnote
omitted). This ambiguity has led to much criticism of the Court's analysis. See, e.g.,
Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of
Cities, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 35, 62-66, 72 (1976); Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale
L.J. 1165, 1167-80 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice: Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J.
1196, 1234-37 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federal-
ism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1065, 1090-96 (1977); Protection of the Environment, supra note 34, at 400-06; Note,
National League of Cities v. Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 467, 471-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A New Approach]. The Na-
tional League of Cities Court provided one example of an unprotected function
through its affirmance of California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). In Taylor, the
Court held that Congress could validly regulate a state run railroad. Id. at 568.
Although the railroad was owned and operated by the state, the Court viewed it as a
common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 563-64. The Court reasoned
that the state had subjected itself to Congressional regulation under the commerce
power. Id. at 568.
44. 426 U.S. at 841.
45. Id. at 853. The Court noted that an emergency situation may justify an in-
terference with state sovereignty because such a condition "endanger[s] the well-
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appears to have extended this reasoning by suggesting that a balanc-
ing approach always be used when dealing with tenth amendment
questions.' Under this analysis, the importance of the federal gov-
ernment's interest must be weighed against the extent of federal in-
terference in the essential affairs of the state.'- Even a substantial
displacement of state policy determinations concerning allocation of
state resources may be insufficient to establish a violation of the tenth
amendment if the federal interest is of overriding significance."
Neither the majority nor concurring opinion addressed those in-
stances in which federal legislation is purportedly directed at private
industry, but its pervasive effect is to regulate the states in an area of
traditional state concern. The Court also did not consider whether
control over land may constitute an essential function of state govern-
ment. The precise issues presented in the SMCRA cases, therefore,
being of all the component parts of our federal system and . . . only collective action
by the National Government [can] forestall" extremely serious consequences. Id. In
making this exception, the Court harmonized National League of Cities wvith Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See note 34 supra.
46. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun did not believe
that the Court's opinion precluded the exertion of federal power in areas such as
environmental protection. He felt it was obvious that in this area the federal interest
outweighed state concerns. Id.
47. Id. Many subsequent cases have accepted Justice Blackmun's interpretation
of National League of Cities. See, e.g., In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581
F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (federal interest in obtaining evidence to enforce criminal
laws balanced against its adverse affect on state needs and policy decisions), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Woods v. Homes and Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
1270, 1296-97 (D. Kan. 1980) (federal interest balanced against interference with
local government's power to issue industrial development bonds). Tennessee v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (federal in-
terest balanced against interference with state tax classification system), Colorado v.
Veterans Adm'n, 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977) (federal interest balanced
against interference with state educational institutions), modified, 602 F.2d 926 (10th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Aaron v. Davis. 424 F. Supp. 1238,
1241 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (interests concerning discriminator%, employment practices
based on age of firemen balanced); Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F.
Supp. 111, 114-16 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (interpreted National League of Cities as estab-
lishing a balancing approach), rev'd on other grounds, 605 F.2d 191 (Sth Cir. 1979).
Other courts have strictly construed the majority opinion. E.g. Hyland v. Fukuda,
580 F.2d 977, 981 n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) (selection of prison guards not deemed integral
to state operations); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1978)
(decision to pay women less than men for same job not deemed integral). Some cases
have noted the ambiguity in National League of Cities and recite both approaches.
E.g., Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp.,
428 F. Supp. 1368, 1369-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); see Beaird & Eilington, supra note
43, at 72 (National League of Cities seems to require a weighing of whether a state's
interests are infringed by federal action and the nature of the federal policy sought to
be furthered).
48. See notes 104-117 infra and accompanying text.
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are left unresolved by National League of Cities. Nevertheless, the
rationale underlying National League of Cities, that the states must
be allowed substantial latitude to govern their local affairs, is broad
enough to provide a framework for analyzing any tenth amendment
question.49
II. THE SMCRA: APPLYING THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE
OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
A. The Majority Opinion
A close reading of National League of Cities suggests that a three-
pronged analysis be applied when congressional legislation purport-
edly infringes upon the power reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment. Initially, the challenged regulation must be directed at
the "States as States.""3  Although this phrase is somewhat
ambiguous," the Court appears to have meant that a tenth amend-
ment issue is presented only when the state is acting in a role that it
has traditionally assumed.' Any restriction of these functions, which
49. The Court in National League of Cities expressed no opinion on instances in
which a similar displacement of integral state functions occurs pursuant to Congress'
spending power or the power granted by section five oF the fourteenth amendment.
426 U.S. at 852 n.17. Many courts subsequently faced with tenth amendment chal-
lenges to federal legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power, war
power, or the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment have, therefore, deter-
mined that the National League of Cities analysis is inapplicable. E.g., New Hamp-
shire Dep't of Employment Security v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1980)
(spending power); Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290,
297-98 (10th Cir. 1979) (spending power); Marshall v. Delaware River and Bay
Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (D. Del. 1979) (fourteenth amendment); North
Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 536 n.10 (E.D.N.C. 1977)
(spending power), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp.,
443 F. Supp. 451, 458 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (war power), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir.
1979); City of Philadelphia v. SEC, 434 F. Supp. 281, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(spending power), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978). But see Walker Field,
Colo. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 298-99 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay,
J., dissenting) (National League of Cities merely expressed no opinion on challenges
brought pursuant to other sources of congressional power and, therefore, the poli-
cies underlying National League of Cities should be applied to such challenges).
50. 426 U.S. at 845.
51. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
52. 426 U.S. at 845. Traditionally, only those acts of state governments charac-
terized as governmental were accorded protection from federal interference. Proprie-
tary acts did not enjoy similar immunity and were subject to federal regulation. See
Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931) (sale of motorcycles to
police force held nontaxable as governmental function); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (state sale of liquor held taxable as a proprietary func-
tion). This approach was expressly rejected in New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572 (1946), and National League of Cities has been interpreted as indicating that the
Supreme Court did not intend to revive the distinction, Schwartz, National League
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are attributes of state sovereignty, must be scrutinized closely."
Second, it must be determined whether these attributes are "essen-
tial to [the] separate and independent existence" of the states."' An
essential function is one the states must exercise to operate effectively
in the best interests of its citizens and which, if subject to federal
interference, would impair the states' ability to govern its own
affairs." Finally, it must be determined whether, by enacting the
legislation at issue, Congress has preempted essential policy decisions
traditionally left to the discretion of the states. '
1. LAND USE-A Traditional and Essential State Function
Land use planning and control laws have traditionally been consid-
ered a local concern of the states and their political subdivisions.' :
of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power And State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 1115, 1128 (1978). The distinction remains useful, however, in
interpreting some of the Court's subsequent decisions. See California v. Taylor. 353
U.S. 553 (1957) (valid for Congress to regulate state operated railroad).
53. 426 U.S. at 845; Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v.
United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
54. 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559. 580 (1911)).
55. In Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth
Circuit suggested a test for determining whether a governmental function is essential
under National League of Cities: (1) the government service or activity is beneficial
to the community and is provided at little or no cost; (2) the service or activity is
provided as a public service and not for financial gain; (3) the service or activity is
principally provided by government; and (4) government is in the best position to
provide the service or perform the activity because of the community's need for it.
Id. at 1037.
56. 426 U.S. at 851.
57. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1. 13-14 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (zoning is an important state function and interference with a local
authority's land use power is only justified when a constitutional right is infringed)
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926) (states should
usually provide zoning ordinances); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County
Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609 n.17 (4th Cir. 1977) (local planning decisions are "'impor-
tant local functions"), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908 (9th Cir. 1975) (local authorities are generally
given responsibility for zoning decisions), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Valley
View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 416-17 (6th Cir. 1955) ('[t]hat the reg-
ulation by a municipality of the use of property within its borders is within its pow-
ers of local self-government ... is now too well-established to be questioned");
United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (broad
discretion should be accorded to local zoning officials); Bossier City Medical Suite,
Inc. v. City of Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 646 (W.D. La. 1980) (zoning estab-
lished through local ordinances is a proper exercise of state power); Construction
Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("Zoning
ordinances have traditionally been entitled to substantial judicial deference."), rev'd
on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S. 934 (1976); R.
Linowes & D. Allensworth, The Politics of Land Use 32 (1975) ('The planning opera-
tion is an arm of local government . . . [and] land-use controls .. .are almost exclu-
sively among the responsibilities of local governments, not metropolitan or interjuris-
dictional bodies.").
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Clearly, state governments are best suited to provide for economic
growth and development through land control legislation.' Because
state legislatures are closer to their constituents, they are more sensi-
tive to citizens' needs and aware of the costs of achieving social and
environmental goals in the state. 9 These needs vary with communi-
ties as well as with topography and climate.' Indeed, in enacting
the SMCRA, Congress acknowledged that, "because of the diversity
in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions,"
the states should retain primary governmental responsibility for im-
plementing the requirements of the SMCRA."' Federal intervention
in state land use planning would depreciate "the opportunity for and
value of participation in local decisions," and would, thereby, impair
the local self-determination needed for successful planning.62
Furthermore, even state interference with local decisionmaking
concerning land use is generally deemed improper because the state
legislature is too far removed from local concerns to assess them
properly.' States have, therefore, traditionally exercised their police
58. The Council of State Governments, Land Use Policy and Program Analysis
No. 1, at 17 (1974) ("Regulation of development is just one of many areas in which
the State is sovereign, and the principle which views local governments as creatures
of the States in such situations has long since been established."); R. Linowes & D.
Allensworth, supra note 57, at 33 ("[K]ey community development decisions are
made locally, so it is natural that planning would be a local matter.").
59. See R. Linowes & D. Allensworth, supra note 57, at 33 (1975) ("The people
closest to the problems can best solve them."); Stewart, supra note 43, at 1231-32
(the federal government is not well suited to determine what goods and services state
citizens need). Some members of Congress believed that the SMCRA removed "from
the jurisdiction of the states governmental functions that can be . . . best exercised
on a local level." Senate Report, supra note 1, at 121 (statement of Sen. Hansen).
60. See R. Linowes & D. Allensworth, supra note 57, at 162. In National League
of Cities, the cities argued that because "[l]ocal [g]overnment is based on need, ...
it is as varied as the need requirements of each community. Climate, topography,
rivers, lakes, seas, all play a part .... Our constitutional scheme of Federalism in-
cludes the guarantee of ballot box control by citizens over their governmental units;
this is the people's power guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment." Brief for Appel-
lants at 111-12, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). This argu-
ment, apparently successfd in National League of Cities, may be analogously applied
to the SMCRA cases. Just as the FLSA amendments had the effect of denying local
governments local autonomy, the SMCRA denies states control over local land plan-
ning and usage. See notes 73-101 infra and accompanying text. Federal control over
concerns necessarily local in nature would violate "[o]ur constitutional scheme of
Federalism." Brief for Appellants at 111-12, 426 U.S. 833; see Comment, Farmland
Preservation Techniques: Some Food For Thought, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 258 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Farmland Preservation].
61. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 101(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (Supp. 11 1978).
62. Stewart, supra note 43, at 1220; see Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114,
1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (The tenth amendment is not violated if "[t]he states retain
broad discretion . . . to control the use of their land and the scope of their economic
development."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
63. See R. Linowes & D. Allensworth, supra note 57, at 155-65. The authors
noted that, although states could legally undertake planning pursuant to their police
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power 64 by delegating most control over land use to local
municipalities. It has consistently been recognized that state defer-
ence to local policy in matters of zoning, for example, is necessary to
safeguard the general welfare of communities. '  Local control over
commercial and residential land uses allows government to structure
more effectively the delivery of services, such as police protection
and fire prevention, that are essential to the safety of its citizens.'
For example, because commercial areas generally have a higher
crime rate than residential areas," consolidating business in one large
locale will better allow local governments to allocate police protection
resources." Because of their closeness to local conditions, municipal
governments can best administer these services. "  It has been
power, the power "has been largely delegated to local governments." Id. at 158. The
states have not been a positive force in assisting local planning because "[t]hey have
not been sensitive to the need to direct their own activities so as to accord with local
master plans." Id. at 162. The authors observed that this is not surprising in light of
the limited success that states have had "in coordinating their own programs and
agencies." Id. at 164. States may be poor coordinators "because state legislatures
commonly meet so infrequently" and, therefore, cannot respond to local conditions
in a timely manner. Id.
64. "The police power is that power that inheres in a sovereign to regulate pri-
vate conduct for the public good." Farmland Preservation, supra note 60, at 261; see
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 1 P. Rohan, Zon-
ing and Land Use Controls § 1.02 [1] (1978). See also Gladden, The Change or
Mistake Rule: A Question of Flexibility, 50 Miss. L.J. 375, 376-77 (1979).
65. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 3S9-90 (1926).
Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Cit of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 9&48
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); R. Linowes & D. Allensworth,
supra note 57, at 158; 5 P. Rohan, supra note 64, § 33.01 [1] n.l.
66. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926);
Trustees of Mortgage Trust of Am. v. Holland, 554 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 1977),
Central Bank and Trust Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 392 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir.
1968); Kroeger v. Stahl, 248 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1957); Dennis v. Village of Tonka
Bay, 156 F.2d 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1946); Greene v. Town of Blooming Grove, 483 F.
Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926); Amersbach %. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979); Stewvart, supra note 43, at 1177.
68. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926)
("[O]pen shops invite loiterers and idlers to congregate; and the places of such con-
gregations need police protection.").
69. Id. at 393. The Euclid Court noted that, because the roads in commercial
areas required more frequent repaving than those in residential areas, consolidating
each in separate larger districts enabled local government to more efficiently meet
repaving needs. After zoning, only those roads in commercial districts needed fre-
quent paving. The result was a saving in the local government's expenditures. Id.
70. Id.; see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.. 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033. 1037 (6th
Cir. 1979); Trustees of Mortgage Trust of Am. v. Holland, 554 F.2d 237, "238 (5th
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argued, in fact, that National League of Cities may be construed as
suggesting that state citizens have certain legitimate expectations tra-
ditionally protected by the state.7 Thus, "policy-based legislation by
Congress that endangers the provision of certain vital services . . . is
constitutionally problematic . . . because it hinders and may even
foreclose attempts by states or localities to meet their citizens' legiti-
mate expectations of basic government services."72 If state govern-
ments generally are incapable of satisfying these expectations, the
federal government cannot be expected to take the place of local gov-
ernments in meeting the local needs of its citizenry.
2. The Loss of State Autonomy
Congress' intent in enacting the SMCRA, unlike its purpose in
passing the FLSA, was not to direct the states to forfeit their legisla-
tive discretion over traditional state functions.' The prime farmland
and original contour provisions do not purport to regulate the states.
On its face, the SMCRA compels neither state enforcement of federal
requirements nor the expenditure of state funds to effectuate congres-
sional policy. 74 If states wish to assume the responsibility for regulat-
ing mining reclamation procedures within their boundaries, they may
formulate their own environmental programs. 73 Thus, Congress be-
lieved the SMCRA allowed the states enough flexibility to implement
the basic guidelines it desired in a manner that would not adversely
affect state sovereignty. 76
Cir. 1977); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Kroeger v. Stahl, 248 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir.
1957); Greene v. Town of Blooming Grove, 483 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Izaak Walton League of Am. v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698, 707 (D. Minn. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
71. L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 5-22, at 312; see Michelman, supra note 43, at
1165. Arguably, land use planning is an integral governmental function under this
rationale. The states and their political subdivisions have generally done all zoning
and land use planning. Hence, their citizens have developed an expectancy that state
and local governments will continue to provide it in their best interests.
72. L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 5-22, at 313 (footnote omitted).
73. See SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 101, 102, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (Supp. II
1978). Professor Stewart has noted that Congress' decision to draft national environ-
mental protection laws, such as the SMCRA, without reference to differences among
states was probably due to the "difficulties of securing legislative consensus on geo-
graphically nonuniform measures, legislators' reluctance to delegate to administrators
broad discretion over policies profoundly affecting the welfare of their constituents,
and the administrative economies of uniform measures." Stewart, supra note 43, at
1219 n.89.
74. See SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 503, 504, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254 (Supp. II
1978).
75. Id. § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. II 1978).
76. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 20, at 102 (statement of Sen. Hatfield);
id. at 8, 25 (statements of Gov. Herschler); id. at 87 (statement of D. Callaghan).
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The effect of the SMCRA, however, is far different from that which
its framers contemplated because it does effectively displace state leg-
islative discretion. Regardless of whether a state formulated reclama-
tion program is rejected or accepted by the Secretary of the Interior,
that state will have no meaningful choice in controlling and planning
for land uses. If the state's plan is not approved by the Secretary, the
SMCRA empowers the Secretary to devise a federal program for min-
ing reclamation.7, In this way, a state's decisions as to the most ben-
eficial uses to which land within its territory may be put is severely
limited. Thus, the states are coerced to yield their authority to plan
for future use of their land to the federal government.' Even when
a proposed reclamation program is accepted by the Secretary, "[t]he
state would merely stand in the shoes of the federal government and
act as its agent in performing the myriad responsibilities required by
the Act."79  Because the states have legislated under the threat of
federal intervention, the effect may be that they are forced to con-
sider how best to avoid further federal encroachment rather than
what is in the best interests of their constituents. ° More specifically,
however, because the SMCRA contains no variance provisions relat-
ing to the reclamation of prime farmland and hills of less that twenty
degrees,"1 the design standards enunciated by Congress are extremely
77. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. 11 1978).
78. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D. Ind.). prob.
juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S.
Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596). In both Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep.
Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D. Ind.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No.
80-231) and Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp.
425, 432 n.6 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538,
79-1596), the courts drew an analogy between the litigation based on the SMCRA
and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In Steward Machine, the
Court found that Congressional action under the commerce power was valid under
the tenth amendment as long as the states were induced, rather than coerced, to act.
Id. at 585-90. The Court rejected the argument that the Social Security Act of 1935,
which allowed employers of more than eight employees a tax credit against federal
unemployment compensation taxes, was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
coerce the states to deal with unemployment in the manner Congress desired. Id.;
see Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974) (federal statute man-
dating a 10% reduction in federal highway funds if federal plan not adopted by a
state held not to be coercive because it did not compel the state to embrace the
federal plan); A New Approach, supra note 43, at 482-83 (discussing federal programs
designed to induce state action).
79. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 126 (minority views of Sens. Bartlett, Dome-
nici, and Laxalt). See generally Energy c. Encironment. supra note 6.
80. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D. Ind.i, prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231) (citing Indiana General Assembly
findings).
81. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 515(b)(i)-(25), 30 U.S.C. § 1265tb)(D25) (Supp. 1I
1978).
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inflexible.8 2 Thus, programs submitted by the states must correspond
in almost every detail to the federal program."
Generally, "[v]ariances are escape mechanisms built into most zon-
ing ordinances that allow relief in instances where uniform application
of restrictions would serve little public good while causing substantial
hardship."8 4 Therefore, this absence reflects Congress' implicit deci-
sion that the farming of certain areas is their best and highest use
possible.8 Although land might be used in more economically or
socially beneficial ways, the states have no choice but to require that
prime farmland be returned to its former level of productivity." °
Admittedly, the land may be used for any purpose the state desires
once it is restored.87 The state, however, is never given the initial
opportunity to provide for variances or to enact laws providing for
broad land use plans.' This scheme is economically inefficient" be-
cause state plans may have to be reevaluated or, if pursued, may
require the needless expenditure of time and money.'O
82. See notes 120-23 infra and accompanying text.
83. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 433-34 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
84. Gladden, supra note 64, at 382 (footnote omitted); see SMCRA, supra note 3,
§ 515(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(e) (Supp. II 1978) (provides for variances from the original
contour requirement). Possibly concerned about a tenth amendment challenge, the
Secretary of the Interior added § 515(e) to the interim, as well as the permanent,
program. See 30 C.F.R. § 716.3 (1980).
85. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1779-80 (S.D. Ind.),
prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231) (citing the Congressional Rec-
ord). Senator Percy remarked that prime farmlands could not be stripmined "unless
... all prime lands that are mined will be returned to their original use and their
original level of productivity." 123 Cong. Rec. 15713 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
Senator Culver added that the SMCRA required "a restoration to prime agricultural
land use [as] a minimum essentiality under [the SMCRA]." 123 Cong. Rec. 15719
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Culver).
86. The SMCRA provides that the Secretary of the Interior may not issue a per-
mit for the mining of prime farmland unless he finds that the operator has the tech-
nological capability to restore the area at least to its previous level of productivity.
SMCRA, supra note 3, § 510(d)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). If a
permit is issued, the land must be restored. Id. § 515,b)(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(7)
(Supp. II 1978).
87. Brief for Appellants at 23-24, Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA)
1769 (S.D. Ind.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231).
88. See Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1778-79 (S.D.
Ind.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); 125 Cong. Rec. S12373
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id. at S12372 (remarks of Sen.
Huddleston).
89. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1976) (FLSA
amendments held unconstitutional partially because they required state expenditures
that would result in a decrease of state services).
90. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
434 (W.D. Va.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596); see
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1976).
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Although the challenged original contour provisions are not as ob-
vious a federal regulation of land use as are the prime farmland
provisions,9 1 they nevertheless deprive the state and local govern-
ments of the discretion to permit site-specific variances.2 In certain
instances, alternatives to the reclamation requirements of the
SMCRA might be desirable and environmentally sound."' Even Con-
gress was aware that not all unrestored land causes environmental
harm,"' and that local governments may prefer to put such land to
other publically beneficial uses." In fact, because there is a scarcity
of flat land in several mountainous states,6 states or local govern-
ments might wish to provide for the utilization of a levelled hill in its
unrestored formY A state might desire, for example, that a hospital
or airport be built or crops be raised in an area subject to the
SMCRA's original contour requirements." Like the alternatives
available to the states with respect to the prime farmland provisions,
however, the state then has two limited options. It can either expend
funds to flatten the land again before development or it may com-
91. See generally SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 515(b)(1)-(25). 30 U.S.C. §§
1265(b)(1)-(25) (Supp. 11 1978). The original contour provisions are not as obvious a
regulation of land use because they do not suggest that the land be returned to a
specific use, as do the prime farmlands provisions.
92. The SMCRA does contain a variance for reclamation of steep slopes, which
are defined as slopes above twenty degrees. SMCRA, supra note 3, §§ 515(d)4),
515(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(d)(4), 1265(e) (Supp. 11 1978). In Virginia Surface AMining,
however, the court found that the Secretary of the Interior's regulations had made
this variance useless because of conditions attached to its exercise. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 436 n.14 (W.D. Va.),
prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596). In the mountainous
Appalachian coal producing states, a return to the original contour may be problem-
atic due to physical and economic difficulties. Id. at 433-,35.
93. Id.
94. 125 Cong. Rec. S12372 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Huddle-
ston) ("[T]he fact is that when you mine coal you can leave benches and you can
leave flat surfaces in the place of steep hillsides without doing any damage to the
environment."); 123 Cong. Rec. 15709 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ('[Plrotection of
environmental values does not in every instance require return to an original con-
tour.").
95. 125 Cong. Ree. S12372 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hud-
dleston); 123 Cong. Rec. 15708-09 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
96. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
434 (W.D. Va.) ("[T]here is a great need for level land in ... Virginia."). prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596); 125 Cong. Rec. S12372
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston) ('"he scarcest commodity in
the eastern section of Kentucky ... is flat land.").
97. See Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp.
425, 434 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-
1596); 125 Cong. Rec. S12372 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Huddle-
ston).
98. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
434-35 (W.D. Va.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
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pletely alter its plans. This has engendered criticism of the SMCRA
from states," private parties,"w and commentators.''
The SMCRA further impairs the states' ability to operate indepen-
dently through its adverse effects on mining companies, although in a
less direct manner. Because several coal operators have already been
driven out of business as a result of their inability to meet the
requirements," a state's decision to exploit certain land for coal min-
ing purposes may never be realized. Moreover, this could cause the
states to lose substantial tax revenues used to support essential health
and educational services within the states, °3 thereby decreasing the
quality or quantity of services its citizens have come to expect. Thus,
because the comprehensive effects of the challenged provisions of the
SMCRA are to undermine state autonomy over land use regulation
and planning for economic growth, they should be held to constitute
a violation of the tenth amendment.
B. The Balancing Approach
Under the balancing approach suggested by Justice Blackmun, the
same result should be reached. It is evident that the SMCRA has an
overly intrusive effect upon the ability of the states to regulate the
use of land within their borders. °' On the other hand, the SMCRA
99. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1776 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 434-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
100. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679, 681,
682 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. and New Market
Coal Company, Inc.); Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1782-84
(S.D. Ind.) (Indiana Coal Association; Meadowlark Farms, Inc.; AMAX Coal Com-
pany; and John A. Conlon), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231);
Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325, 1331-34, (S.D. Iowa
1980) (Star Coal Company); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v.
Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 436-37, 442 (W.D. Va.) (Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, Inc.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-
1538, 79-1596).
101. Brownell, supra note 3, at 685-87; Cage, The Failure of the Interim Program
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: The Need For Flexi-
ble Controls, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. 595, 611-25 (1979); Truitt & Abeles, supra note 3,
at 615-16.
102. In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp.
425 (W.D. Va.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596), the
court noted that "[tJhe cost of production of coal is increased up to seventy percent.
On occasion the economic impracticality of strip mining coal is outweighed by
physical realities; equipment may not be available to cover the highwall on a steep
slope to restore the original contour." Id. at 434. As a result, mine operators must
either suspend operations or initially decline to undertake operations. See id.
103. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425,
434-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
104. See notes 73-103 supra and accompanying text.
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reflects three important, but divergent, federal interests: to improve
environmental protection regulations and encourage agricultural pro-
ductivity without decreasing the level of coal production. '" Environ-
mental protection is, of course, a worthy goal. Although Congress did
not find that a public health hazard existed, ' the reports on which it
relied indicated that the quality of life in unreclaimed mining areas is
declining."7 In fact, the cumulative effects of unchecked surface
mining could conceivably create an emergency situation.' '  The
SMCRA is, therefore, generally directed at lessening the risk that
current mining practices will ultimately lead to dangerous environ-
mental conditions. 109
The specific purpose underlying the provision challenged, how-
ever, rather than the purpose of the SMCRA generally, should be
considered in evaluating each provision. Although the purpose of the
challenged original contour provisions is environmental protection,
strict adherence to these requirements is not always necessary to pro-
tect the environment."' In many cases, the effect of meeting the
requirements is merely to restore the appearance of the landscape.,'
Therefore, the general implementation of these requirements may
displace state decisionmaking or make their realization considerably
more expensive for state governments without effectuating a signifi-
105. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102(f). 30 U.S.C. § 1202f) (Supp. 11 1978); see
House Report, supra note 1, at 60, 71, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 598, 609; Energy v. Environment, supra note 6. at 641.
106. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 49-53 (careless mine reclamation may
lead to dangers to public health and safety); House Report. supra note 1, at 57-60,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 595-98 (current practices could
cause significant environmental damage).
107. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 49-53; House Report, supra note 1, at
58-59, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 596-97.
108. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 50; cf. 125 Cong. Rec. S12364 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hart) (preventing enviroumnental abuses "is neces-
sary to preserve the future economic use of mined land."), Staff of Senate Comnn
on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.. State Surface Mining Laws.
A Survey, A Comparison With the Proposed Federal Legislation, And Background
Information III (Comm. Print 1977) (Memorandum of the Chairman) (environmental
protection standards needed to prevent further degradation of the land and water).
109. See SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 11 1978); 125
Cong. Rec. S12364 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hart) "'17he Surface
Mining Act is designed to prevent in the future the wholesale destruction of our
land, water, and air caused by uncontrolled strip mining practices.").
110. See generally 125 Cong. Rec. S12372 (daily ed. Sept. 11. 1979) (remarks of
Sen. Huddleston).
111. See id. at S12373 (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) ("I have seen lands that have
been reclaimed, and in some instances in Pennsylvania where I have seen such
lands, they are more attractive than the original terrain."); cf. id. at S12372 (remarks
of Sen. Huddleston) (restoration is not always needed to avert environmental dam-
age); 123 Cong. Rec. 15709 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (preservation of environ-
ment does not always necessitate restoration of land to its original contour).
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cant improvement of environmental conditions. The prime farmland
provisions, moreover, are not primarily related to health concerns.
Rather, they are designed to encourage productivity of the land."2
The federal government clearly has a significant interest in ensuring
both that land resources are not depleted and that the country's food
needs are satisfied."' There is, however, no danger that either of
these situations will arise in the near future."'
Admittedly, the consequences of state and local decisions concern-
ing the environment and agricultural production that are beyond the
control of state governments may be the proper subject of federal
concern. "' When there is neither a present nor foreseeable national
emergency, however, the justification for federal intervention be-
comes questionable." 6 There is, in fact, no national food emergency,
112. SMCRA, supra note 3, § 102(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (Supp. 11 1978); see
notes 81-90 supra and accompanying text.
113. Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a
National Problem, 8 Ecology L.Q. 655, 655 (1980). Geier notes that certain prime
farmland issues are national in scope, such as the wisdom of "increasing reliance on
irrigated cropland" and the squandering of land resources, as well as "the fear that
continuing land losses threaten the long-term capability of American agricultural pro-
duction to meet domestic and world food needs." Id.
114. Id. at 655-56, 660 (the adverse consequences of current land practices are of
a "long-term" nature). Both the House and Senate failed to even mention this hazard
in their respective reports while discussing the adverse impacts of current mining
practices. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 49-53; House Report, supra note 1, at
58-60, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 596-98.
115. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (federal decisions may control if
"potential environmental effects extend geographically beyond the control of one in-
dependent local or regional government"); Stewart, supra note 43, at 1216 ("If spill-
over losses are sufficiently significant and multidirectional then all states may gain
... from centralized determination of environmental policies."); see Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (federal control may be proper when
"the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality
that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."). In Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court noted that "whereas the Federal Government might
legitimately defer to New York City zoning in [most] matters . . . , a different issue
would be posed by the location within the city of an atomic reactor." Id. at 1037.
Federal power might override state power if New York were incapable of controlling
the hazards caused by such a danger. Id.
116. In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp,
425, 432 n.5 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538,
79-1596), the court noted that "all constitutional restraints should be strictly con-
strued except in a national emergency." Id. at 432 n.5; see Beaird & Ellington, supra
note 43, at 73 n.164. Dissenting in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), Justice
Rehnquist conceded that an acute emergency could justify temporary congressional
action. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He indicated, however, that the
emergency might have to be tantamount to declared war to justify congressional
action under the commerce clause. Id. at 558.
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and thus, the high degree of interference with the states' roles as
allocators and planners of economic development caused by the
prime farmland provisions is unwarranted." Moreover, because the
federal regulations provide for uniform restoration of certain land to
its original contour, even when there is no risk that environmental
harm will occur, the SMCRA unduly restricts local and state gov-
ernmental ability to control land use, and constitutes an impermissi-
ble infringement of the powers reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
This conclusion need not herald the demise of the S.MCRA."' The
states have not suggested that there be no improvement in surface
mining restoration requirements or in environmental protection
standards."' Rather, they urge that Congress has failed to select the
least restrictive means of dealing with an important national
concern."2 The states principally seek only broader parameters with-
117. Geier, supra note 113, at 665-66 (because there is no food emergency, the
major impact of land use decisions is on the state and local governments), see Farm-
land Preservation, supra note 60, at 279 ("Zoning and land-use regulation are
uniquely of local concern."). See generally Myers, Te Legal Aspects of Agricultural
Districting, 55 Ind. L.J. 1 (1979).
118. Relatively small changes in the SMCRA's drafting could well rid the SMCRA
of its current constitutional infirmity. In attempting to do this during 1979, tile Sen-
ate noted "three amendments to the Surface Mining Act ... (would be] a meager
but important beginning to bringing the act back in line with the congressional
objective of State primacy." 125 Cong. Ree. S12352 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (re-
marks of Sen. Hatfield). Furthermore, § 707 of the SMCRA provides that "[i]f any
provision of this chapter on the applicability thereof to any person or circumstances
is held invalid, the remainder of [the SMCRA provisions] and the application of such
provision[s] to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
SMCRA, supra note 3, § 707, 30 U.S.C. § 1297 (Supp. 11 1978).
119. The coal mining states agree that there must be affirinative and sound en-
vironmental protection and reclamation regulations. Indiana v. Andrus. 14 Envir.
Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1775-81 (S.D. Ind.), prob.juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (19S0
(No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F.
Supp. 425, 431-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 t19S0) (Nos. 79-
1538, 79-1596). During Congressional hearings to determine the effectiveness of tile
SMCRA requirements, testimony indicated that state and local governments did not
contest reclamation procedures in general. Senator Domenici observed that the
states and local officials did, indeed, care about protecting the environment and sup-
ported the surface mining bill. Oversight Hearings, supra note 20. at 237-3S (state-
ment of Sen. Domenici). A director of a state reclamation enforcement division noted
that "[w]e are not here ... to ask that the environmental performance standards...
be weakened." Id. at 75 (statement of Hamlet Barry 1ll). Further, a mayor from a
mining state testified that his state supported Congress' intent in enacting the
SMCRA, although he did not feel that Congress' intent had been effectuated. Id. at
110-11 (statement of J. Terry Dolan).
120. See, e.g., 125 Cong. Rec. S12359 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (letter from Gov.
Dixie Ray Lee to Sen. Hatfield).
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in which to exercise mining reclamation variances to effect other state
purposes for the economic and social welfare of their communities. 2'
During debates in 1979 on a proposed amendment to the SMCRA,
one senator suggested, for example, that both federal and state in-
terests would be protected if hills were returned to seventy-five per-
cent, rather than one hundred percent, of their original contour.'22
The visual difference would be minor and the land would be suffi-
ciently stable to achieve Congress' environmental protection
purposes." If the state then elected to use the land in a level condi-
tion, the costs of flattening the land would be decreased. The inclu-
sion of variances in the SMCRA would allow compromises of this
type to be made.
Furthermore, although one of Congress' stated purposes was to
avoid discouraging coal production,124 current federal regulations
appear to unnecessarily impede the development of coal resources."
Several coal companies have been driven out of business by the in-
flexible and burdensome provisions of the SMCRA." 6 In addition,
121. Indiana v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1769, 1776 (S.D. Ind.), prob.
juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 434-35 (W.D. Va.), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596).
122. 125 Cong. Rec. S12372 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Warner).
123. See id. (remarks of Sen. Huddleston).
124. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 52; note 14 supra and accompanying
text.
125. Brownell, supra note 3, at 685-87; Gage, supra note 101, at 611-25; Truitt &
Abeles, supra note 3, at 615-16; N.Y Times, Jan. 11, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5. The
adverse impact of the SMCRA on mining was foreseen and feared by many members
of Congress who were concerned that the SMCRA would impair the nation's energy
program and impede coal production. See generally House Report, supra note 1, at
191-99, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 719-28 (dissenting views
of Reps. Bauman, Sebelius, Symms, Edwards, Rudd, and Lujan). Some members of
Congress were troubled because the bill was orginally drafted in the energy abun-
dant period prior to 1973 and not substantially changed to take the energy shortage
into account. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 125 (minority views of Sens. Bart-
lett, Domenici, and Laxalt). Similarly, some members of Congress feared that the
SMCRA would cause the price of coal to increase. See Senate Report, supra note 1,
at 128-29 (minority views of Sens. Bartlett, Domenici, and Laxalt); House Report,
supra note 1, at 191-92, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 719-21
(dissenting views of Reps. Bauman, Sebelius, Symms, Edwards, Rudd, and Lujan).
Although House members who favored the bill introduced statistics that indicated
these effects would not occur, House Report, supra note 1, at 147-49, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 679-81, the dissenters noted another govern-
ment sponsored report that reached a contrary conclusion. Id. at 192, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 720-21 (dissenting views of Reps. Bauman,
Sebelius, Symms, Edwards, Rudd, and Lujan).
126. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. During Senate debates on an
amendment to the SMCRA in 1979, Senator Hatfield noted that "[c]oal production
remains stagnant . . . ; surface mine productivity per man per day has decreased
steadily . . . ; and the regulatory burden continues to increase." 125 Cong. Rec.
S12351 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
[Vol. 49
1981] SMCRA
the price of coal has increased substantially during the past several
years,'27 and the SMCRA can be expected to contribute to further
price escalations in the future.'2"
Congressional provision for the incorporation of variances into the
SMCRA would both dissipate tenth amendment objections to the
challenged provisions and would better effectuate Congress' desire to
stabilize coal production. ' State retention of the discretion to allow
site-specific variances is consistent with Congress' desire that the
states have primary responsibility for implementing the SMCRA.
These variances would allow the states to plan for the use of land in
an economically efficient manner because, if a variance were em-
ployed at sites at which there was no danger of environmental dam-
age, the states could avoid requiring costly procedures to flatten land,
or having to alter their plans, to maintain the delivery' of essential
services to their citizens. If the Secretary of the Interior were in a
position to oversee such state decisions, rather than to effectively dic-
tate them to the states, environmental safeguards could still be
retained.'" Thus, allowing for broader design criteria, as opposed to
127. During 1973-78, coal prices increased by over 1007,. U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 604 (1979). A breakdown of the coal
price increase showed that coal prices were relatively constant from 1975-77, but
increased significantly during 1978, the first year in which the SMCRA %as in effect.
Id. at 747. The cost of mandatory reclamation under the SMCRA may be responsible
for as much as one third of the 1978 average price of coal per ton. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1979, § A, at 44, col. I ("Turning a coalpit into farmland or pasture adds an
estimated $2 to $7 a ton to the price of coal. The average price of coal last year was
822.40 a ton."); cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, § B, at 3. col. 4 (*[Cloal went from
878 per ton . . . to 8105 two months later.").
128. See House Report, supra note 1, at 124, reprinted in 119771 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 656. See generally Bro\vnell, supra note 3. at 681-8. Although
members of Congress believed that mining reclamation would have a minimal impact
on the price of coal, House Report, supra note 1, at 147-49, reprinted in [19771 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 679-81, this determination seems questionable in light of
the problems operators are experiencing in reclamation. See notes 102, 126 supra.
129. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (If "[t]hc
states retain broad discretion under the regulations to control the use of their land
and the scope of their economic development," the tenth amendment is not
violated.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[T]he Tenth Amendment may prevent Congress from
selecting methods of regulating which are drastic' invasions of state sovereignty
where less intrusive approaches are available."), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); L. Tribe, supra note 10, § 5-22, at 317-18 (Courts
should be less likely to override congressional decisions if such choices adopt the
least restrictive manner of effectuating Congress' end).
130. During Senate debates on the SMCRA in 1979, it appeared that several sena-
tors believed that Congress had, in fact, intended the Secretary of the Interior to
function in a supervisory capacity. 125 Cong. Rec. S12367 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979)
(remarks of Sen. Randolph) ("[T]he Office of Surface Mining's role ... should be one
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strict performance standards, would achieve a preferable accommoda-
tion of national and state interests. 3'
CONCLUSION
Our federal structure establishes a relationship of mutual respect
between the states and the federal government. National League of
Cities v. Usery reaffirms this principle by indicating that the federal
government ought not to interfere unduly with the local affairs of the
states. The SMCRA substantially interferes with state affairs because
it deprives the states of autonomy over traditional and essential func-
tions. When there is no emergency to warrant federal intervention
and congressional policy can be effectuated in a manner that will
accommodate state interests, such an approach should be used. Only
then will the tenth amendment reservation oF powers to the states be
meaningful.
Lawrence H. Kaplan
of oversight."); id. at S12353 (remarks of Sen. Ford) (Congress must stop the OSM
from "legislating by regulation" and must "restructure the thinking of bureaucrats" as
to Congress' intent). Furthermore, in response to persistent and justifiable federal
concerns that states would be unenthusiastic in enforcing such standards, Brownell,
supra note 3, at 686 n.50, the "[flunding of private interest groups to monitor the
regulatory process could reduce opposition to more flexibility at the state level." Id.
131. A recent report of a government regulatory council concluded that the
SMCRA requirements are, indeed, needlessly inflexible. United States Regulatory
Council, Cooperation and Conflict 31, 40-41 (Jan. 1981) ("The use of 'performance
standards' rather than 'design standards' can provide needed flexibility in complying
with regulations."); N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1981, § A, at 22, col. 1.
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